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CHANGING STRATEGIC NAVAL 
BALANCE 

U.S.S.R. vs. U.S.A. 


Prepared at the Request of the 
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NINE 

s 






for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services 


21-832 O 


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1968 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 20 cents 








HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 


Second Session, Ninetieth Congress 
L. MENDEL RIVERS, South Carolina, Chairman 

PHILIP J. PHILBIN, Massachusetts 

F. EDWARD HEBERT, Louisiana 
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois 
O. C. FISHER, Texas 
PORTER HARDY, Jr., Virginia 
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida 
JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania 
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York 
OTIS G. PIKE, New York 
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri 
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan 
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina 
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri 

G. ELLIOTT HAGAN, Georgia 
CHARLES H. WILSON, California 
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California 
DONALD J. IRWIN, Connecticut 
FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado 
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington 
HERVEY G. MACHEN, Maryland 
SPEEDY O. LONG, Louisiana 
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER, New Mexico 

SANTIAGO POLANCO-ABREU, Puerto Rico 
Resident Commissioner 

John R. Blandford, Chief Counsel 
Philip W. Kelleher, Counsel 
Frank M. Slatinshek, Counsel 
Earl J. Morgan, Professional Staff Member 
William H. Cook, Counsel 
Ralph Marshall, Professional Staff Member 
John J. Ford, Professional Staff Member 
George Norris, Counsel 
Mary Jo Sottile, Counsel 
Oneta L. Stockstill, Executive Secretary 


WILLIAM H. BATES, Massachusetts 
LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois 
ALVIN E. O’KONSKI, Wisconsin 
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana 
BOB WILSON, California 
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California 
CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN, Michigan 
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York 
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri 
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio 
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont 
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania 
CHARLES A. HALLECK, Indiana 
CARLETON J. KING, New York 
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama 
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio 
JAMES V. SMITH, Oklahoma 





LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 


Members, House Committee on Armed Services 

To the Members: The ability of the United States to maintain its 
commerce and abide by its military commitments to other nations is 
basic to our entire defense posture. In Southeast Asia we have supplied 
98 percent of our goods by sea and 300,000 of our troops traveled 
there in ships. 

Because of my concern for what has been happening to America’s 
sea power I established a Special Subcommittee on Sea Power on 
September 24. Prior to that I requested the American Security 
Council to examine the situation with respect to our sea power using 
unclassified sources, as they did when I earlier requested them to 
examine our strategic military power. Their earlier report, “The 
Changing Strategic Military Balance: USA vs. USSR” was a result 
of their examination of the unclassified material available in the 
open literature. The present report, “The Changing Strategic Naval 
Balance: USSR vs. USA” is also the result of their study of un¬ 
classified statements. This report is being presented as a Committee 
Print in order to be available for all so that they may see what is 
involved in our present situation. 

I wish to express my appreciation for the work involved in preparing 
this study to John\Fisher, President of the American Security Council, 
and to Admiral H7 D. Felt, USN (Ret.), who chaired the Special 
Subcommittee responsible for this particular study. 

As I said in my letter of transmittal on “The Changing Strategic 
Military Balance”, while the Committee on Armed Services does not 
take any position as to the accuracy of the statements contained in 
the report and can neither affirm nor deny the whole or any portion, 
I believe, nevertheless, that the report deserves careful analysis. 


L. Mendel Rivers, 

Chairman. 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 


c 


Foreword .page 3 

Section I. NAVAL OBJECTIVES: U.S.S.R. VS. U.S.A . 6 


A. Soviet Naval Objectives. 6 

B. U. S. Naval Objectives. 9 

Section II. UNDERSEA FORCES.14 

A. Soviet Undersea Forces.14 

B. U. S. Undersea Forces .15 

Section III. SURFACE FORCES .18 


A. Soviet Surface Forces.18 

B. U. S. Surface Forces.21 

Section IV. MERCHANT MARINE.27 

Section V. NEW SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS.31 

Section VI. SOVIET HARASSMENT TACTICS.35 

Section VII. U. S. AND SOVIET OCEAN STUDIES: 

A COMPARISON .38 


Section VIII. U. S. OCEANIC SUPREMACY THREATENED. 40 






















THE CHANGING STRATEGIC 
NAVAL BALANCE 

U.S.S.R. vs. U.S.A. 


FOREWORD 

This study on The Changing Strategic Naval Balance has been pre¬ 
pared for the House Armed Services Committee at the request of Com¬ 
mittee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers. It is a follow-on study to The 
Changing Strategic Military Balance: U.S.A. VS. U.S.S.R ., a study 
that the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council 
conducted last year, also at the request of the House Armed Services 
Committee. 

In requesting this study, Chairman Rivers asked that this same com¬ 
mittee make an assessment of the growth and significance of the Soviet 
maritime establishment based on unclassified sources only. 

We have drawn upon our own experience and utilized the experience 
and insights of many naval specialists in the United States and abroad. 
We have consulted with many thoughtful students of sea power and of 
Soviet military and political operations. In addition, we have made use 
of many monographs, reports and essays on various phases of Soviet sea 
power, ranging from oceanography to port development. Some of the 
more useful sources for specifics on the new Soviet sea power included 
testimony before Congressional committees by spokesmen for the U. S. 
Navy and other Defense Department personnel. Public presentations by 
senior commanders also have been utilized. Among the reliable profes¬ 
sional publications that proved to be of aid to this subcommittee were 
The Military Balance of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Proceedings 
of the U. S. Naval Institute, Royal United Service Institution Journal, 
Astronautics & Aeronautics, Survival, Naval Review , Navy League’s 
NAVY: The Magazine of Seapower, Marine Corps Gazette, Marine 
Rundschau, Revue Militaire Generale, Naval War College Review, Naval 
Engineers Journal, and Jane's Fighting Ships. Material published after 
September 1968 has not been included in this study. 

We believe that these sources are adequate as to the general char¬ 
acter of Soviet ships and naval ordnance, although these sources do not 
compare with the classified sources available to defense intelligence 
officials. Thus, since the U.S.S.R. Navy is growing rapidly, ship counts 
based on good unclassified sources understate the U.S.S.R. side of the 
naval balance. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the open sources are 
fully adequate to give the broad dimensions of the Soviet naval build-up, 
and that from a study of them it is possible to discern and describe the 


3 





strategic concepts governing the U.S.S.R.’s massive and growing mari¬ 
time establishment. 

While this study details ship types and naval weapons systems de¬ 
veloped and utilized by the Soviet Navy, primary emphasis is placed 
upon the Soviet Union’s new understanding of the uses of sea power. 
The U.S.S.R.’s new oceanic vision is the development with the largest 
historic importance and the greatest significance for oceanic defense of 
the United States and its free world allies. Thus, the study explores the 
use being made of Soviet naval might to promote the interests of the 
U.S.S.R. and the Communist system. 

In preparing this study, we have stressed Soviet maritime capabilities 
and set these in perspective against the state of American naval forces. 
We strongly believe that the Soviet Union’s massive move of strategic 
power to the oceans dictates a rapid build-up and modernization of 
American sea power but we have not recommended U. S. naval force 
levels or fleet dispositions. 

Respectfully submitted, 
signed / Admiral H. D. Felt, USN (Ret.) 

Chairman 

General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.) 

Lt. General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.) 

Dr. James D. Atkinson 

Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Elton W. Grenfell, USN (Ret.) 

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee, USN (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral R. E. Libby, USN (Ret.) 

Dr. Robert Morris 

Dr. Stefan T. Possony 

General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.) 

Brig. General Robert C. Richardson, USAF 
(Ret.) 

Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.) 

General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.) 

Majoi; General Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.) 

Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, USN (Ret.) 

Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.) 

Dr. Edward Teller 

Rear Admiral Chester C. Ward, USN (Ret.) 

General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.) 

Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.) 

as members of a special subcommittee of the 

National Strategy Committee of the 

American Security Council. 


4 






OPERATIONAL NAVAL STRENGTH 


U.S.A. U.S.S.R. 



- T 1 



Attack submarines 

105 

Attack submarines 

250 


41 * 


100 * 

Missile submarines 

Missile submarines 

Surface to surface 
missile ships, 

destroyers and cruisers, 

Q** 

! 

Surface to surface 
missile ships, 
destroyers and cruisers, 

25 

Conventional destroyers 

177 

Conventional destroyers 

86 

■ iii 

Minecraft 

86 

Minecraft 

300 

Missile patrol boats 

0 

Missile patrol boats 

150 


8 


3 

Helicopter carriers 

Helicopter carriers 

Anti submarine 
warfare carriers 

8 

Anti submarine 
warfare carriers 

0 

Attack carriers 

16 

1 

Attack carriers 

0 

Battleships 

1 

Battleships 

0 


^Includes submarines equipped for cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles. All U.S. boats 
equipped for ballistic missiles. 

U.S. has substantial lead in number of submarine launched missiles. 


**The U.S.A. does have 71 surface-to-air missile equipped major ships. 


5 



































I. NAVAL OBJECTIVES: U.S.S.R. VS U.S.A. 


The existing and programmed strength and composition of U. S. 
and Soviet naval forces is rooted in the respective national objectives of 
the two countries. The United States is the leader of an alliance of an 
inter-oceanic community of free nations that have major maritime in¬ 
terests and that depend on freedom of the seas. To uphold the cause of 
freedom, whether in Southeast Asia, Europe or Latin America, it is im¬ 
perative that the United States have unrestricted use of the world's 
oceans and that it be able to exercise naval supremacy in a variety of 
possible war situations. 

Thus, if the United States fails to maintain a clear lead in all signifi¬ 
cant forms of naval power, if the strategic naval balance is not in its 
favor, the United States will be unable to fulfill its role as leader of the 
free and independent nations of the world. Furthermore, as the Soviets 
are strongly emphasizing strategic naval forces—shifting much of their 
increasing missile power to sea—it is imperative that the United States 
have superior naval forces with which to deal with the new Soviet threat. 

In recent years, despite the tremendous growth of the Soviet naval 
and maritime establishment and the continuing growth that the U.S.S.R. 
has planned for the Soviet Navy, there continues to be inadequate U. S. 
response to the new Communist challenge on and under the seas. The 
inadequate level of response to challenge gives cause for concern in view 
of the ample evidence of increasing Soviet naval capabilities and the 
bold employment of Soviet naval forces in crisis situations. 

If the United States intends to maintain the sea power supremacy 
it gained during World War II and has held to the present, it will have to 
significantly augment its naval forces for the contests ahead. 

A. Soviet Naval Objectives 

For the first time in its history, the Soviet Union is developing an 
offensive maritime strategy and is seeking supremacy at sea. 

The naval forces now being created by the Soviet Union and the uses 
of sea power now being made by the U.S.S.R. are part of the overall 
Communist design of total victory in the struggle against the United 
States and other free world nations. Even as the Soviets have developed 
massive ground and air forces and have armed themselves for warfare 
in space, they are striving to dominate the oceans. 

Also, acute sensitivity to the strategic importance of control of “nar¬ 
row waters" and “water gates" has been a natural inheritance of the 


6 


Soviet Union from Czarist Russia. Lack of warm weather, fully adequate 
all-weather ports, constriction of naval and merchant marine operations 
from Kronstadt and St. Petersburg (Leningrad) through the narrow 
waters of the Gulf of Finland and the Kattegat, the restrictive barricade 
lof the Bosporus and Dardanelles at the exit of the Black Sea, and the 
debacle of Tsushima Strait in the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War combined 
to create a legacy of frustration which helped drive Soviet Russia to 
break through water gates and narrow waters to the open seas of the 
world. 

Behind the new Soviet sea power is an awareness that Communist 
domination of the globe can only be achieved by supremacy at all major 
points on the spectrum of conflict. The leadership of the U.S.S.R. is 
determined to obtain superiority over the United States and its allies 
under all combat conditions. 

The Soviets have acquired an oceanic vision. They know that the 
sea is the major artery giving life to the free world. 

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, has 
said of Soviet naval forces: 

“By any measuring stick, they (the Soviets) are today the sec¬ 
ond largest sea power in the world. In a mere 10 years, the Soviet 
Union with dedication of purpose, large outlays of funds, and 
with priorities equivalent to or even surpassing their space pro¬ 
gram, has transferred itself from a maritime nonentity to a major 
seapower.”! 

The Soviet fleet now includes 250 attack submarines, 100 missile¬ 
firing submarines, (50 of their submarines are nuclear-powered), 25 sur¬ 
face-to-surface missile-equipped major warships, 86 conventional de¬ 
stroyers, approximately 300 minecraft, 150 missile-armed fast patrol 
boats, three helicopter carriers and many other types of warships. The 
Soviets have more than 2,000 naval vessels in commission. Virtually all 
of these vessels are of post-World War II construction. Backing up the 
Soviet Navy is a modem merchant marine—the fifth-ranking merchant 
navy—of approximately 1,400 ships of 10.4 million tons. 

Soviet naval forces also are designed to vastly enlarge the zone of 
Soviet psycho-political pressure. In addition, they are a major compon¬ 
ent of Soviet striking power in limited and general war. 


1. From an address by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval 
Operations, at The American Legion National Convention in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, September 11, 1968. 


7 



The Soviet determination to cancel America's sea power advantage 
has been candidly stated by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet fleet 
commander. “The flag of the Soviet Navy," he has said, “now proudly 
flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the U. S. will have 
to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas." 2 

Marshal M. V. Zakharov, Soviet Chief of Staff, said in a press con¬ 
ference February 16, 1968: “The time when Russia could be kept out of 
the world's oceans has gone forever. The imperialists can no longer have 
them to themselves. We shall sail all the world's seas; no force on earth 
can prevent us." 

Shortly before his death in early 1967, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, 
the Soviet Minister of Defense, placed sea power on a par with the 
U.S.S.R.'s missile command when he declared that in Soviet planning; 
“First priority is being given to the strategic missile forces and atomic 
missile-launching submarines—forces which are the principal means of 
deterring the aggressor and decisively defeating him in war.” 3 

In the absence of a general war situation, Soviet naval forces have 
politico-military missions to perform, plus support of “wars of libera¬ 
tion" and various interventionist operations. In general war, the Soviet 
warships undoubtedly would strike at free world sea-based power, at 
merchant shipping, and at bases, ports and coastal industrial centers 
in many parts of the world. The U.S.S.R.'s attack submarine force— 
more than twice the size of the U. S. undersea counter force—obviously 
prepares for the mission of cutting the free world's lines of communica¬ 
tions—the movement of oil and minerals essential to the industrial ma¬ 
chine of the West. The nuclear-armed submarines would have the mission 
of launching missile attacks at naval bases, missile-launching facilities, 
strategic centers and airfields in coastal regions, and at large strategic 
and population centers within firing range of the oceans. If the Soviets 
determined on a surprise attack, they could deploy their naval forces 
well before D-day, not only for direct attacks on land targets but also 
at the critical points on the shipping lanes. In addition, Soviet naval 
forces would be engaged in supporting Soviet ground troops in a sweep 
across Europe or into the Middle East. 

In determining the full dimensions of the U.S.S.R.'s oceanic objec¬ 
tives, it is not enough to consider the construction and deployment of 
warships. The U.S.S.R.'s maritime strategy also involves the build-up 


2. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov quoted by General H. J. Kruls in NATO’s Fifteen 
Nations, June-July, 1968. p. 12. 

3. Current History, October, 1967. 


8 



of a massive merchant fleet. This fleet makes possible the leap-frogging 
of Soviet power from contiguous land masses to countries that are de¬ 
pendent on sea transport, such as Cuba and North Vietnam. 

Not only are the Soviets employing their merchant marine to support 
a war thousands of miles from the principal cities of the U.S.S.R., but 
they are also utilizing their merchant navy to disrupt world trading pat¬ 
terns and to manipulate and undermine ocean freight rates. 4 

Thus, the Soviet Union has in its maritime establishment a powerful 
instrument of international pressure and economic warfare. The Soviet 
ships can be used by Moscow to drive the Western countries out of tra¬ 
ditional markets and disrupt free world economies. 

The Soviet merchant marine program for the future gives indication 
of Moscow’s ambitions at sea. By 1980, the Soviets plan to have 20 mil¬ 
lion tons of shipping and to possess the largest merchant navy in the 
world. 

The meaning of the various Soviet moves at sea is that the U.S.S.R. 
plans a global employment of its naval forces. It already dominates the 
central land mass on this planet. Now it seeks control of what geopoliti¬ 
cal thinkers refer to as the “world ocean.” To many Americans this stra¬ 
tegic picture may come as something of a shock; heretofore it has been 
assumed by many that the Soviet Union’s naval forces had only defen¬ 
sive missions. 

B. U. S. Naval Objectives 

While the Soviet Union carries out an across-the-board expansion 
of naval might that is aimed at giving Communism primacy on all the 
oceans, the United States is moving at a dangerously slow pace in re¬ 
placing aging ships constructed during World War II and in developing 
new sea-based strategic systems. For example, in the 1960’s, the civilian 
defense leadership resisted rapid modernization of the U. S. Navy, which 
suggests that the seriousness of the Soviet oceanic challenge has not 
been grasped by influential segments of public opinion. 

Certainly, any thorough inspection of the overall strategic position 
of the United States will indicate plainly that the United States needs 
control of the ocean spaces. Since the end of World War II, the United 
States has been committed to a struggle to maintain peace with freedom 
and to protect those nations that wish to avoid Soviet conquest and 
domination. In almost every phase of this effort, U. S. naval forces have 


4. Verner R. Carlson, Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute, May, 1967. p. 48. 


9 



played a significant role. In the Vietnam conflict, for example, 98 per¬ 
cent of the war material transported to Vietnam has moved by ship 
under the protection of the U. S. Navy. 

The principal American aims in maintaining strong naval forces 
are: 1) protection of the territory and independence of the United 
States; 2) deterrence of World War III; 3) protection of the territory 
and independence of allied and friendly nations; 4) preservation of the 
vital overseas interests of the United States; and 5) maintenance of 
normal oceanic trade so that the United States and other peaceful states 
may receive and ship raw materials and finished goods. 

To accomplish these aims, the United States has maintained the 
largest navy in the world with powerful offensive and defensive capabili¬ 
ties in its surface, sub-surface and aerial forces. 

Because of the global commitments of the United States, the United 
States Navy has to be prepared for a great variety of naval contingencies, 
including amphibious operations, riverine warfare, anti-submarine war¬ 
fare, protection of vital sea lanes, heavy air strikes against inland targets 
and strategic ballistic missile attacks against pre-assigned targets. Ad¬ 
miral Moorer has said in this connection that “our weapon systems must 
have ready and reliable ‘scaled firepower’ to guarantee the success of 
our strategies and tactics in every situation.” 5 

In view of the many possible contingencies, U. S. naval forces have 
to be of an exceptionally high caliber, cover a wide spectrum and be able 
to go anywhere with proper logistic support. The United States cannot 
afford weakness in any element of sea power. The United States requires 
a large, balanced fleet with considerable numbers of modem warships 
of all types, ranging from minecraft to nuclear submarines. 

The naval burdens on the United States certainly will increase 
markedly in the 1970’s. Great Britain’s withdrawal East of Suez has 
created an enormous power vacuum in the 28 million square miles of 
the Indian Ocean. The old imperial lifelines still are important in the 
final third of the 20th century, when many old and new nations are 
threatened by Soviet and Chinese Communist imperialism. The United 
States will have to guard these lifelines with its ships for, as President 
Lyndon B. Johnson has said, “there is no one else” to do the job. 6 


5. From an article by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer in Ordnance, May-June, 1968. 
p. 559. 

6. Statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson cited by George E. Lowe in Pro¬ 
ceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute, June, 1968. p. 32. 


10 




In this period of shrinking overseas bases, it is necessary for more 
of America's power to be moved to sea and to the ocean depths. It may be 
desirable, for example, for the U. S. to develop a forward sea-based anti- 
ballistic missile intercept system (SABMIS). Sea power offers forward 
protection, mobility and flexibility in this atomic-missile era. 

If the United States is to accomplish the aims for which it creates 
and maintains the naval forces, nuclear power for surface ships and other 
progressive developments must be accented in the years ahead. The 
potential of innovation in naval ordnance must be exploited to full ad¬ 
vantage. Deep submergence vessels must be designed and constructed 
for the undersea warfare of the 1970's and 1980's. The possibilities of 
sea power barely have been touched. Each innovation in warship design 
and in naval weaponry triggers fresh opportunities and dangers in the 
confrontation with the U.S.S.R. 

The United States has to keep in mind the importance of naval in¬ 
novation and the danger of obsolescence. Unfortunately, the strategic 
notions of “parity", popular during the McNamara years, had among 
their by-products the throttling of efforts to achieve maximum naval 
advantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. American restraint in naval con¬ 
struction in the 1960's has failed to bring any slowdown in the U.S.S.R.'s 
naval construction program. The Soviet sea power drive shows that dis¬ 
armament by restraint won't work. 

It is both tragic and extraordinary that the U. S. Department of 
Defense ever thought that parity with the Soviets would open an ave¬ 
nue to lasting peace in the world. Soviet military theorists have always 
been perfectly frank in stressing the importance of military superiority 
and the absurdity of the parity concept. 

For example, Major General Nikolai Talensky, a senior Soviet stra¬ 
tegist, said in 1962: 

“It was impossible ... to reach a state of balanced military 
power. How could one achieve qualitative parity in weapons, 
even if ‘quantitative parity’ were to be accepted in principle? 

How could one find equivalents for various types of rockets and 
bombs? Given an equal number of missiles on both sides, differ¬ 
ences in deployment could upset the balance. . . . Therefore . . . 
it would be impossible to achieve stable peace through bal¬ 
anced deterrence.” 

In the post-McNamara era, it is essential that Americans understand 
that there is no safe plateau of sea power on which this nation can rest 
in comfortable fashion. On the contrary, there is accelerating improve¬ 
ment in naval warfare systems, with no end in sight. 


11 


The danger to the United States lies in failure to respond with maxi¬ 
mum effort to the Soviet naval challenge. The implications of a failure 
of U. S. leadership at sea, were it to occur, are staggering. To contem¬ 
plate a loss of U. S. naval supremacy is to contemplate disaster on an 
epochal scale. The freedom of the United States and its allies is anchored 
in control of the oceans. The construction of ships takes much time, how¬ 
ever, as does establishment of new task forces and fleets. In order to 
prevent the Soviets from realizing their ambitions at sea, the United 
States will have to move aggressively in the next few years in a crash 
build-up of all sea-based strategic forces. 


12 


U.S.A. 


AGE OF CONVENTIONAL 

DESTROYERS 

(OPERATIONAL) 



Two-thirds of the U.S. Active fleet is over 20 years old. Only one-tenth 
of the U.S.S.R. fleet is over 20 years old. The figures on this page show 
the breakdown in two categories. 


AGE OF ATTACK 
SUBMARINES 


U.S.S.R. 



21-832 0- 68-3 


13 














SECTION II. UNDERSEA FORCES 


A. Soviet Undersea Forces 

Of all the elements of Soviet naval strength, the most alarming is 
the growth of its submarine force. The chief naval threat comes from the 
U.S.S.R.’s huge undersea fleet of 250 attack submarines and 100 missile¬ 
firing submarines, the largest force of submarines ever created. This So¬ 
viet submarine force is a vast aggregation of undersea might compared 
with the handful of U-boats with which Hitler began his naval offensive 
in World War II. This small force of German submarines, totaling 56 
boats (or less than one-sixth the Soviet Union’s undersea fleet in 1968), 
was minor in effectiveness compared to the Soviet submersibles of today. 
Yet the German subs caused the United States and Britain great losses 
in the Battle of the Atlantic. In spite of commencing an all-out building 
program, the U. S. ship construction rate did not exceed the German de¬ 
struction rate until well into 1943. Another relevant factor today is that 
the anti-submarine warfare capability of the U. S. and allied navies still 
lags behind the submarine warfare threat. Recent deactivation of 50 
warships and 100 naval aircraft, many of them anti-submarine warfare 
planes, underscores U. S. weakness in this critical field of naval opera¬ 
tions. 

With regard to the composition of the Soviet submarine force, Jane's 
Fighting Ships reports that “this year the numerical strength (of the 
U.S.S.R.’s undersea fleet) seems to have held and to have tilted up¬ 
wards, but, of course, in aggregate power the Soviet submarine fleet is 
immensely stronger from the influx of big modem and nuclear-powered 
submarines at the head and the draining off of the older and smaller 
boats at the tail.” 7 Jane's also reports that the Soviet Union plans to 
utilize submarines as launching platforms for a major portion of its 
missile arsenal. 8 

Of major significance is the fact that the Soviet Union now possesses 
submarines with an underwater launch capability, indicating that the 
U.S.S.R.’s submarine builders have mastered the kind of technology 
pioneered by the United States in the development of the Polaris fleet 
ballistic missile submarines. 9 These Soviet submarines reportedly can 
fire their missiles from below the ocean’s surface to a range of 800 miles. 

While the United States has more sophisticated submarine-based 
missiles than the Soviet Union and many more of them, the U. S. has 
halted construction of fleet ballistic missile submarines whereas the 


7. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1967-1968. p. V. 

8. Ibid., p. V 


14 



Soviets are continuing with a large program of missile-firing submarine 
construction. The U.S.S.R.’s missile-submarine construction capacity 
is estimated at 20 such submarines per year. For the long run, what is 
of central importance is the programmed undersea fleet of the Soviet 
Navy, not the existing fleet. 

While the Soviets are rapidly expanding their submarine missile 
force, they also are consolidating their lead in attack submarines. 10 
With at least 250 attack submarines, the Soviet Navy has more than a 
2 to 1 numerical advantage over the U. S. Navy in this area of sea war¬ 
fare. Almost all of the Soviet attack submarines have been built within 
the last 13 years, whereas only 45 of the 105 U. S. attack submarines are 
of post-World War II construction. The Soviet Union’s force of non¬ 
missile submarines cannot be dismissed as a minor threat. These under¬ 
sea craft represent a serious threat to U. S. surface forces. It is easy to 
grasp what would be the effect on the giant American sealift to Vietnam 
if vessels in transit had to deal with attacks by conventional submarines. 

In facing up to the Soviet undersea challenge, the U. S. also has to 
bear in mind that the era of deep submergence fighting craft is only 
beginning. As the Soviets sought and achieved leadership in orbital 
weapons, they most assuredly are seeking superiority in the weapons 
of inner space—the ocean depths. The Soviets already have attempted 
to buy commercially-developed American research submarines capable 
of descending to great depths. As new steels are developed, new types 
of undersea combat craft will be built—and a new naval race, as part 
of the Cold War, can be expected. 

B. U. S. Undersea Forces 

The U. S. Navy’s submarine force, with 41 Polaris submarines and 
105 diesel and nuclear-powered attack submarines now in the fleet, is 
static in terms of numbers. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, in 
his statement on the 1969-1973 defense program, acknowledged (1/22/ 
68) that “the Polaris-Poseidon program is essentially the same as the 
one I presented last year.” * 11 Though 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines 
will be equipped with the more sophisticated Poseidon missile, no new 


9. A statement at a press conference July 17, 1968, given by Admiral John McCain 
Jr., then Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe. 

10. Report No. 1645 of the U. S. House of Representatives, printed July 5, 1968. 

11. Posture Statement of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on the fiscal year 1969-73 defense pro¬ 
gram and 1969 defense budget, January 1, 1968. p. 71. (Hereafter referred to as 
Posture Statement, January 1, 1968.) 


15 



missile-firing submarines are planned. A follow-on submarine system 
called ULMS (underwater long-range missile system) has been proposed 
by the Navy, but only preliminary studies have been authorized. 12 Sub¬ 
marines of this type, which will be needed in the future, would carry 
intercontinental missiles and could be on target as soon as they leave 
port. 

The cut-off of U. S. fleet ballistic missile submarine construction, 
while the Soviet Union continues to build missile submarines, should 
be a matter of deep concern. The halt in American missile submarine 
construction gives the Soviet Union an opportunity to take the lead in 
this type of warfare system. 

To date, the most advanced U. S. submarine is the USS Dolphin , 
launched in early June, 1968. This undersea craft displaces 900 tons and 
is capable of firing submarine-rocket weapons. According to Ocean 
Science News, the Dolphin will be able to dive to around 6,000 feet. She 
will have a secondary role as an oceanographic research craft. 

Senator John O. Pastore, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, has said: 

“It is now clear to the Committee that the Department of De¬ 
fense has grossly underestimated the rate at which the Soviets 
are improving their nuclear submarines. The Committee is con¬ 
cerned that the Department of Defense does not apparently 
fully appreciate the significance of the rapid strides being 
made by the Soviets in this field.”!3 

Specialists in submarine warfare also are concerned about the limi¬ 
tation on the numbers of nuclear attack submarines, in view of the huge 
Soviet merchant marine and large force of surface missile ships—all 
suitable targets in a naval war. As now programmed by the Department 
of Defense, the nuclear-powered attack submarine forces of the U. S. 
Navy eventually will consist of 69 submarines. 14 Nine of these nuclear 
submarines will not be of first-class attack submarine design. Mr. Mc¬ 
Namara said in his last defense posture statement: “We expect to in¬ 
crease the force to a total of 60 ‘first-class' SSN's.” 15 

The rationale for this arbitrary number (which won't be reached 


12. Fiscal Year 1969 Navy Budget-Posture Statement Highlights distributed by 
the Navy Department. 

13. Senator Pastore, on June 21, 1968, released a censored version of closed hear¬ 
ings on “Nuclear Submarines of Advanced Design.” 

14. Report No. 1645 of the U. S. House of Representatives, printed July 5, 1968. 

15. Posture Statement, January 1, 1968. 


16 




until 1973) has never been publicly stated. It is undisputed, however, 
that the Soviets have more than twice as many attack submarines as the 
United States and that the majority are of much more recent con¬ 
struction. 

By holding down the nuclear attack submarine forces (only 33 
nuclear-powered submarines at present), defense policy-planners in 
effect are requiring the U. S. Navy to cover fewer patrol stations, thereby 
exposing the United States to considerable danger. The limitation in 
numbers also rules out submarines being assigned to special missions 
of vital importance to the country. Finally, the limitation does not take 
into account possible submarine loss by enemy action or accident. 

The failure to strengthen the nuclear attack submarine force in 
sufficient numbers is critical, since about half the U. S. Navy's anti¬ 
submarine warfare capability rests in the attack subs. 

The Soviets treat their submarine force as a matter of prime national 
importance. U. S. programming for undersea strength fails to reflect a 
corresponding concern with the opportunities and dangers of submarine 
warfare. If the U. S. fails to initiate new submarine construction pro¬ 
grams, the Soviets may have assured undersea supremacy by the mid- 
1970’s. 


17 


SECTION III. SURFACE FORCES 


A. Soviet Surface Forces 

The Soviet naval threat is not exclusively submarine in character. 
The U.S.S.R. is striving for excellence in many areas of naval warfare 
and in other types of warships and support vessels. 

For a number of years after World War II, the Soviet Navy con¬ 
sisted of a miscellaneous collection of obsolescent Soviet-built warships 
and former Axis vessels turned over to the U.S.S.R. Because of the poor 
quality of the ships, the Soviet Navy was not regarded as a viable naval 
force. Technological progress was almost non-existent in the Soviet 
fleet. 

The new Soviet Navy, which displays both technical excellence and 
professional zeal, has been developed and expanded under the vigorous 
leadership of Admiral Gorshkov, who took command of Soviet naval 
forces in 1956 at age 46. Under the supervision of Admiral Nikolai 
Isachenkov, deputy for shipbuilding and armaments development, new 
classes of surface ships were created that the Soviet naval command 
believes will revolutionize naval warfare in the future. 

Admiral Isachenkov joined guided-missile systems to surface ships 
of different sizes and with different missions. 16 After experimenting 
with guided-missiles on the older “Sverdlov” class cruisers, Soviet naval 
designers came up with the new “Kresta” class guided-missile light 
cruiser which has surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile systems, 
as well as conventional guns. The first “Kresta” class cruiser was 
launched in 1965. Five are now operational or undergoing trials. These 
missile warships, or rocket cruisers as they are termed by the Soviets, 
are equipped with missiles having a 450-mile range. 

Examination of Soviet publications indicates that the operational 
task groups of the Soviet Navy in the future will consist of “Kresta” 
class cruisers and “Kynda” class destroyers that also are equipped with 
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The Soviets apparently 
believe that these groups of missile ships could effectively challenge 
U. S. aircraft carrier oriented task groups in the Mediterranean or on 
other waters on the globe. In a recent statement, Admiral Gorshkov 
said: 

“Now we have an oceanic fleet that can challenge the enemy 
in the open seas of the world. Our navy must be able to destroy 
enemy targets on land. Inland targets are often more important 
than marine targets. For this purpose, the guided-missile- 


16. Memorandum from Dr. Victor Fediay, Library of Congress. 


18 






equipped submarines and surface ships and rocket-equipped air¬ 
craft of naval aviation must be on constant alert in different 
parts of the globe.”!? 

The new Soviet concept of naval power also is illustrated in this 
statement from Soviet Rocket Troops (Military Publishing House, Mos¬ 
cow, 1967): “The ground troops and fleet can mutually support each 
other with ‘rocket fire’ at a distance which is very significant and incom¬ 
parable with anything in the past.” 

Other types of missile ships include the short-range guided-missile 
patrol boats of the “Osa” and “Komar” classes. These powerful and 
interesting new naval craft, of which the U.S.S.R. has approximately 
150, represent a remarkably economical maritime striking weapon. The 
newer “Osa” boats displace 200 tons and are 131 feet overall. They have 
four large hood-type missile launchers for the Styx missile. 

As their names indicate—“Komar” means mosquito and “Osa” 
means wasp—the tactical intention, we judge, is to use them in a sur¬ 
face wolf pack operation. 

Never before has so much power been packed into so small a craft. 
They are the true pocket battleships of the missile era. Moreover, these 
boats introduce into Soviet naval forces short-range rocket capabilities 
in a manner comparable to the introduction by the Soviets of inter- 
mediate-range ballistic missiles into their system poised against NATO. 
They have a capability for striking severe blows against Western forces 
in the Mediterranean, for example, thereby upsetting the strategic equa¬ 
tion in that vital theater. 

Assignment by the Soviets of “Osa” and “Komar” boats to Egypt, for 
instance, is another disturbing development. In trying to gain control 
of the seas, the Soviets obviously intend to utilize the “pinprick” navies 
of satellites and client states. The Revue de la Defence Rationale, com¬ 
menting on the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath by a “Komar” 
boat, said of this type of craft: 

“The threat is far from being negligible for our naval forces as 
well as for those of our allies with responsibilities in the Medi¬ 
terranean.”! 8 

The “Komar” and “Osa” boats in the Mediterranean exemplify the 
technological breakthrough that Soviet naval forces have achieved. Com¬ 
mander Pierre Laura of the French Navy observed that the sinking of 


17. Ibid. 

18. Commander Pierre Laura, Revue de la Defence Nationale (Paris), January, 
1968. 


19 




the Elath by Egyptian surface-to-surface Styx missiles aboard two 
“Komar” type craft marked “a turning point in warfare between surface 
ships.” 

This was the first time that a warship was sunk by surface-to-surface 
missiles fired from another vessel. It was also the first time that a modem 
warship was destroyed by a vessel of a smaller tonnage using a weapon 
other than a torpedo. The seriousness of the Styx missile problem is 
evident in that no surface-to-surface missile system with an adequate 
range is in general service in the U. S. Navy or the navies of allied coun¬ 
tries. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean—and naval forces operating 
in other global regions where “Komar” or “Osa” boats are operational— 
must drastically alter operating procedures. They cannot be assigned 
to positions remote from aircraft carriers, for air cover is the only pro¬ 
tection in view of the absence of counter weapons on surface ships. This 
means an overall restriction of fleet movements and an infinitely greater 
need for close surveillance of fast patrol boats in the hands of “pinprick” 
navies. Moreover, the U. S. has to consider the possibility that the 
missile boats have a nuclear capability. The state of the art in surface 
missilery does not preclude such a possibility. 

The Soviet Navy is by no means an unconventional navy, exclusively 
equipped with exotic types of vessels. There are escorts, coastal mine¬ 
sweepers and an efficient fleet train of specialized ships, including nuclear 
submarine support ships, fleet service and supply vessels and ocean¬ 
going tugs—the types needed by a large, balanced fleet. In addition, 
there are many oceanographic vessels, minecraft, icebreakers and elec¬ 
tronic intelligence-gathering ships. 

The broadscale character of the Soviet naval build-up can be dis¬ 
cerned from support ship construction. In the last few years, the Soviets 
have built six modem ships for missile supply and maintenance of 
nuclear-powered submarines. The “Ugra” class vessels, for example, were 
built for serving nuclear-powered undersea craft. 19 They are equipped 
with a large derrick for handling missiles and torpedoes. The three ships 
of this class also have powerful radar and a landing platform for heli¬ 
copters. The Soviets also have built the “Alligator” type landing ships 
of 4,000 tons that are the equivalent of modem U. S. LST landing craft. 
They can transport from 8 to 10 tanks as well as the new naval infantry 
created by the U.S.S.R. 

The Soviet Navy's ability to carry out amphibious operations also 
has been strengthened by the construction of three helicopter assault 


19. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1967-1968 (Soviet section). 


20 



carriers. 20 These carriers also may serve in a command ship role in “over 
the beach” operations. These ships can handle 30 to 35 helicopters and 
are equipped with surface-to-air missiles. They will greatly enhance the 
Soviet Unions ability to intervene militarily in regions remote from 
Soviet air bases. 

In addition to missile-equipped destroyers, the Soviet Navy also has 
a strong force of conventionally armed destroyers—the workhorses of 
any fleet—for defensive or offensive operations. These are modem ves¬ 
sels with good sea-keeping qualities and extensive anti-submarine and 
anti-aircraft armament. 

In summary, the Soviet Union’s surface naval force is the second 
largest in the world. It is oriented towards missile warfare at sea. In 
addition, there are many ships designed for support missions in coastal 
zones. While the Soviet Navy lacks a naval air arm such as the United 
States possesses, it has long-range, land-based reconnaissance planes that 
act as the eyes of the fleet, plus a global force of fishing vessels that are 
naval auxiliaries and that operate in an intelligence-gathering capacity. 
The Soviet Navy also has a strong capability in minelaying, a type of 
warfare in which the U.S.S.R. long has specialized. 

Increased deployment of the Soviet Navy’s surface fleet is assured. 
In this regard, the Soviets have the advantage of close cooperation with 
the navies of the Communist Bloc countries and a variety of revolution¬ 
ary nations. Viewed overall, the Soviet surface fleet is a force of major 
magnitude that is destined to play an even larger role in the politico- 
military operations of the Soviet Union in the 1970’s. 

B. U. S. Surface Forces 

While the United States has built many surface ships of advanced 
fighting ability in recent years, the amount of new construction seems 
inadequate to meet the overall naval needs of the country. Two factors 
have to be considered: 1) much of the existing fleet was built during 
World War II and is nearing the end of its useful life and 2) the com¬ 
mitments of the United States entail U. S. naval operations on a global 
basis. 

Two-thirds of the active U. S. fleet were built more than 20 years 
ago, 21 Even with costly overhauls and rebuilding, the life expectancy of 
these vessels is not great. Because of the complexity of new sea warfare 


20. The New York Times, Feb. 14, 1968. 

21. John T. Gilbride, President, Todd Shipyards Corp., speech in New York City, 
June, 1968. 


21 






systems, involving demands for complicated electronics, the old sea¬ 
going platforms are ill-fitted for modification. It is not economical to 
load aging hulls with expensive new equipment. The problem of age 
faced by the U. S. Navy is in marked contrast to the situation in the 
Soviet Navy where only 10 percent of the warships are over 20 years old. 

The country would not have cause for serious concern if adequate 
replacement programs had been authorized, but these have not been 
approved despite a decade of warnings about the danger of “bloc ob¬ 
solescence.” These warnings are based on solid fact. Of the 177 conven¬ 
tional destroyers in the fleet, 163 are of World War II vintage. Of the 16 
attack carriers in commission, 7 are of wartime construction. All 9 anti¬ 
submarine warfare carriers date from the same period. 

In his final posture statement, Mr. McNamara said that even by the 
mid-1970 , s only one-half of the ships in the Atlantic Fleet amphibious 
force will be modem, 20-knot ships. 22 Mr. McNamara’s program for 
attack carriers showed that in 1972 the United States would have the 
same number of carriers as today and three of them would be of World 
War II construction. 

The number of new ships authorized has to be viewed in the per¬ 
spective afforded by America’s growing military commitments and the 
loss of overseas bases. In 1953, the United States had the rights to use 
551 major overseas bases. 23 By 1966, our total bases numbered 179. 
Many base rights have been lost because of changing political situations. 
The likelihood is for a continuing contraction of base rights, with a re¬ 
sulting increased demand on naval forces including carrier-based avi¬ 
ation. 

Reference already has been made to the need for American sea 
power in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, throughout the Southern Hemis¬ 
phere, there is a developing need for mobile sea-air forces with a role of 
protecting friends and allies of the United States. The expanding com¬ 
mitments for the 1970’s cannot be met with naval forces created for 
commitments of the 1940’s and 1950’s. Yet, the 1969 defense budget 
statement envisions no overall increase in aircraft carriers between now 
and 1972 and looks to a total of only four nuclear-powered carriers in 
the future. In the same statement, Mr. McNamara also noted that the 
number of carrier aircraft had been reduced. These statements indicate 


22. Posture Statement, January 1, 1968. p. 129. 

23. From an address by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer to the National Security 
Industrial Association, September 28, 1967. 


22 



a failure to appreciate the continuing need for a vital component of sur¬ 
face naval forces. 24 

Although the Soviets are pushing with great vigor to attain superior¬ 
ity in many areas of sea warfare, they have not thus far seen fit to 
develop the mobile air power for strike operations afforded by attack 
carriers. Their reasons for this are not clear in the light of the tre¬ 
mendous role that carrier-based aircraft are playing in the Vietnam war. 
Carriers will continue to play this role in future military confrontations 
over the sea, beach and inland areas anywhere in the world where ade¬ 
quate air bases do not exist. The United States must not falter in main¬ 
taining the presently unique advantage she holds in aircraft carriers. 

For 20 years, the United States has relied on the reserve fleet in 
times of national emergency. But the day of taking ships out of moth¬ 
balls is drawing to an end. Vintage fire support ships, including one bat¬ 
tleship, have been reactivated for Vietnam duty, but the military crises 
of the next decade will require the employment of new vessels, not 
naval antiques. 

Fortunately, the United States has moved ahead in the area of river¬ 
ine warfare, coastal patrol and interdiction. Inshore and river warfare, 
an almost forgotton form of naval combat, has been relearned by the 
U. S. Navy and several types of efficient shallow water vessels have been 
developed for this type of combat. Entirely new concepts have been 
developed, such as the coordination of riverine craft with rocket-armed 
naval helicopters—some of them operating from helopads on landing 
craft in the rivers of Vietnam. These new methods and equipment have 
broadened considerably the ability of the United States to fight “brush- 
fire” wars in backward lands where the waterways are the only means 
of communication. 

Another area in which the U. S. may make major strides is in naval 
ordnance. The Vietnam war has resulted in a new appreciation of the 
importance of naval gunfire. General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., USMC, 
Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, has stated: 

“We place primary reliance on it (naval gunfire) . . . Some 
500,000 rounds of naval gunfire ammunition were fired in sup¬ 
port of the Marines in the last calendar year, 1967, from cruisers, 
destroyers and rocket ships.”25 


24. Posture Statement, January 1, 1968. p. 119. 

25. General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, in 
testimony before Congress. Quoted in Navy, June, 1968. 


23 






Improvement in naval guns is now an important challenge. The pub¬ 
lic is not generally aware of the possibilities of gun development. The 
application of modem technology to conventional naval ordnance al¬ 
ready has resulted in shells that can be fired 30 percent farther than 
customary ranges. 26 Rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP) or fin-stabilized 
shells are proving their worth in Vietnam. With RAP, five-inch guns 
mounted on a destroyer can outdistance the eight-inch guns mounted 
on a cruiser. This is only the beginning. Ordnance specialists see the 
possibility of a RAP shell being fired more than 100 miles from 16- 
inch guns like those aboard the battleship New Jersey. If naval guns 
had a range of 100 miles, warfare at sea would undergo drastic change. 
Thus the first country to make the complete shift to RAP naval ord¬ 
nance will have a significant edge over other naval powers. 

An area of special concern, however, is the lag in development of 
surface-to-surface missiles for the U. S. Navy. Until recently, the U. S. 
lacked surface-to-surface missiles specifically designed to deal with 
weapons such as the Soviet Styx missiles that sunk the Israeli de¬ 
stroyer Elath. In February, announcement was made that a defensive 
missile, the Sea Sparrow, has been installed aboard the nuclear carrier 
Enterprise. 27 The Sea Sparrow system will pick up hostile planes or 
missiles at a range of 10 to 15 miles. The missiles are fired when the tar¬ 
get is eight miles away. They travel at four times the speed of sound, 
whereas the Styx missiles are subsonic. The Sea Sparrow system is 
scheduled for installation aboard U. S. destroyers as protection against 
Soviet anti-ship missiles. 

Another area of concern is nuclear-powered surface ships. The U. S. 
Jias only four such vessels—the carrier Enterprise, the cruiser Long 
Beach, and the frigates Bainbridge and Truxton. 

In the late 1950’s, when the United States developed nuclear power 
for warships, it was in a position to move ahead rapidly with nucleariza¬ 
tion of the American surface fleet and to score a colossal advance on the 
Soviets. Unfortunately, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa¬ 
mara opposed nuclear power for the U. S. surface fleet. He resisted ef¬ 
forts to complete the propulsion revolution in the fleet, and the naval 
posture of the United States suffered accordingly. Years were lost— 
years in which the U. S. could have moved far ahead of the U.S.S.R. 
in naval forces. 

The value of nuclear-powered surface ships has been proven in op- 


26. Robert D. Heinl Jr., Navy, August, 1967. p. 11. 

27. Fiscal Year 1969 Navy Budget-Posture Statement Highlights, pp. 1 and 7. 


24 



erations off Vietnam. In the case of conventionally-powered warships, 
strategic mobility is limited by the need for refueling at sea. Enemy 
action, bad weather and other factors can inhibit refueling, which is 
time-consuming at best and which requires time off station as well as 
the services of a considerable fleet train of tankers. With nuclear fuel, 
there is no need to refuel. Ships no longer are tied to bases or tanker 
support. Moreover, the ships can operate almost continuously at high 
speed, enabling them to undertake more complex missions. A nuclear 
task force can gain the nation valuable time in a crisis. It is in the 
national interest, therefore, that more nuclear-powered ships be con¬ 
structed for the U. S. Navy. 

The United States has powerful surface forces and sophisticated 
naval weapons systems. But the number of new ships authorized seems 
insufficient to meet future commitments. Moreover, greater effort must 
be devoted to exploiting all available technologies so that the United 
States will retain its favorable position on the high seas. To this end, it 
is timely to reduce emphasis on a rigid cost-effectiveness formula that 
elevates accounting factors above security factors. The need is for the 
United States to concentrate on whatever combat advantages may be 
gained from a new ship or weapon. 


25 



NEW MERCHANT FLEET 



These figures and the figures on the previous page show the USSR 
merchant fleet as new and growing and the US merchant fleet as 
overage and contracting. 


AGE OF MERCHANT FLEET 


U.S.A. 

U.S.S.R. 

80% 

more than 
20 

years old 


20% more than 
10 years old 


80% 
less than 

10 

years old 

20% less than 
20 years old 




26 


















SECTION IV. MERCHANT MARINE 


As the Soviet Union’s merchant marine expands, it serves to en¬ 
hance the U.S.S.R.’s attainment of strategic objectives on the oceans. 
The expansion is a major development in the history of our times. 

In 1950, the Soviet Union’s merchant navy ranked 21st among 
such fleets. By 1966, it ranked fifth. And by 1970, it is expected that the 
Soviets will have 12 million tons of shipping, as against 1.9 million in 
1950.28 

Today, the U.S.S.R. has approximately 1,400 ships of 10.4 million 
tons. The U. S. has fewer than 1,100 ships aggregating 14.8 million 
tons. Between 1950 and 1966, the U. S. active merchant fleet contracted 
from 1,900 ships totaling 22 million tons. Moreover, of all the merchant 
shipping on order throughout the world, 24 percent (456 vessels) are for 
the Soviets, whereas the U. S. has only 51 merchant ships on order. 

The Soviet merchant fleet is as distinctive qualitatively as it is quan¬ 
titatively. Four out of five Russian merchant ships are less than 10 
years old, whereas four out of five of the U.S.-flag vessels are of World 
War II vintage or older! 

The huge expansion of their merchant fleet gives the Russians a 
powerful new weapon in the Cold War. It is a weapon that has military, 
economic and political effectiveness. 

The Russians fully understand the importance and potential of the 
merchant fleet they have created. Victor G. Bakayev, the Soviet Minister 
of Merchant Marine, has said in Red Star: 

“The fleet has been joined by hundreds of new and improved ves¬ 
sels of various types... The creation of a Soviet merchant marine 
has made it possible to free the nation from dependence on for¬ 
eign vessels for maritime shipping. Today the Soviet Union can 
deliver any cargo to any point on earth, using high-speed So¬ 
viet ships.”29 

Evidence supporting Minister Bakayev’s assertion may be found in 
the record of the number of Soviet ships transporting war material to 
North Vietnam between 1964 and 1967. In 1964, 47 Soviet merchant 
vessels reached North Vietnam; in 1965, 79; in 1966, 122, and in 1967 
the number of Soviet ships in the military sealift reached the record 
of 433—evidence of a major cargo capability. 


28. Victor G. Bakayev, “The Growing Soviet Merchant Marine,” Red Star, March 
13, 1966. 

29. Ibid. 


27 





The Soviets are not only setting records on cargo movement, but 
they are also creating strong passenger services. Whereas in the late 
1940’s, the U.S.S.R. had only a few old passenger vessels, today it has 
passenger service on 150 regular routes totaling more than 120,000 
miles. The ships on these routes generally are less than 10 years old. N. 
Malakov, writing in Vodnyy Transport (1966), asserted that “the So¬ 
viet sea fleet takes third place in the world by a number of accommo¬ 
dations.” 30 At any rate, the Soviets have 170 passenger-carrying ves¬ 
sels with a total tonnage of approximately 500,000. Indicative of the 
new Soviet ambitions at sea is the new service between Montreal and 
Leningrad, utilizing the 750-passenger vessel, Alexander Pushkin. 

One of the U.S.S.R.’s ultimate goals is domination of world trade. To 
this end, it is pushing ahead with all types of ship construction and im¬ 
provements in maritime facilities. The Soviet fishing fleet clearly reveals 
the U.S.S.R.’s goal of domination at sea. Since 1954, for example, the 
Soviet Union has invested $4 billion in its fishing fleet and fishing in¬ 
dustries’ facilities ashore. Whereas American trawler owners are hard- 
pressed to find funds to build or modernize trawlers, the Soviets have 
constructed many trawlers costing more than $2 million each. The in¬ 
vestment is worthwhile, for in 1964—the last year for which figures 
are available—the U.S.S.R. landed 5.4 million metric tons of fish in 
ports of the Soviet Union. 31 This was almost twice the U. S. catch. And 
the Soviets have set a goal of 8.5 million metric tons for 1970. 

In the late 1950’s, when the U.S.S.R. was beginning its big build-up 
at sea, it relied heavily on the shipyards of Eastern and Central Europe. 
This capacity is still being used. In 1965, for instance, four East German 
shipyards constructed 55 vessels for the Russians. But today the Rus¬ 
sians themselves are constructing large numbers of ships of different 
types, including tankers and icebreakers. The Soviets have pioneered 
in development of the nuclear-powered icebreakers, Lenin and Arktika. 
Another new Soviet icebreaker (this one built in Finland) is the Kiev, 
a vessel with a displacement of 15,000 tons. The icebreaker is diesel- 
electric powered and has three screws. Three more icebreakers of this 
type are under construction in Finland. 

The merchant navy which the U.S.S.R. has built enables Moscow to 
expand Russian foreign trade enormously. In 1952, Soviet foreign trade 
amounted to only 4.7 million rubles. By 1963, this trade totaled 13 bil¬ 
lion rubles, and the regime has set a 1980 goal of 52 billion rubles. 


30. Vodnyy Transport, August 11, 1966. p. 4. 

31. New York Times, May 8, 1966. 


28 



While building new ships at home and buying others abroad, the 
Soviets also have been vigorous in developing and strengthening port 
facilities. At IPichevsk, for example, the Soviets have constructed a 
major new Black Sea oil port. The piers can accommodate tankers of 
100,000 tons. In 1966, the Soviet government also announced that it 
planned to expand the capacity of ports 40 percent by 1970. 

Much public attention has been devoted to Russian shipments of 
missiles to North Vietnam, but scant coverage has been given to the 
manner in which missiles and other war material are delivered. It is the 
Soviet merchant marine that does much of the job. 

The Applied Physics Laboratory of the University of Washington at 
Seattle is one of the few organizations that has analyzed the Soviet 
sealift in detail. 32 “Because of the shallow draft in the North Viet¬ 
namese ports,” said the university report, “only fairly small Russian 
ships have been used. Most of the ships are dry cargo ships ranging from 
3,000 to 11,000 gross tons and sailing mainly from Odessa. The Soviet 
Union is supplying all types of cargo with its merchant fleet. Such equip¬ 
ment includes coal, fertilizer, sulphates, oil, marine engines, machine 
tools, dump trucks and lifting cranes of up to 16 tons capacity.” It is 
no wonder, therefore, that the stream of Soviet merchant ships has 
been the decisive factor in the reinforcement and strengthening of North 
Vietnam. 

A vital factor in the Russian merchant marine expansion is the total 
of national resources devoted to this oceanic enterprise. In 1965, the 
Soviet government devoted more than $600 million to the construction 
of merchant vessels. The United States spent only $150 million in the 
same year. These figures make clear the different priorities that the 
Soviet Union and the United States assign to a vital segment of sea 
power. 

Viewed overall, the observer of the Soviet merchant fleet finds a tre¬ 
mendous reversal of role and ambition. The free world countries grew 
strong and stayed free through control of the seas, including leadership 
in global commerce. The Soviet Union, however, is being allowed to move 
into the position of maritime supremacy that hitherto has belonged to 
the sea-voyaging free nations of the West. 


32. Raymond Moley report for Los Angeles Times, 1968. 


29 




CHANGES IN U.S.A. AND U.S.S.R. MERCHANT FLEE 


U.S.A. 


1950 


1900 

ships 

22 

million 

tons 


1968 


1100 

ships 

14.8 

million 

tons 


U.S.S.R. 

1950 1968 


1400 

ships 

10.4 

million 

tons 


1.9 

million tons 


30 











SECTION V. NEW SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS 


Today, when Soviet submarines, surface warships and naval auxili¬ 
aries crowd the seas, and the U.S.S.R.’s naval forces are second in num¬ 
bers to the United States, the purpose of the continuing build-up of 
Communist sea power should be of deep concern to the American people. 
What counts, in the last analysis, is not the number of ships the Rus¬ 
sians have today or the character of their naval hardware, but their 
purpose in creating a powerful ocean fleet. 

The heavy Soviet commitment to the various forms of sea power— 
from offensive mining to seaborne missile forces—clearly indicates that 
the authorities in Moscow have a considered doctrine of sea power. They 
know what they want to achieve with ships at sea and how they will go 
about attaining their objective. The evidence is at hand that the Rus¬ 
sians, once completely land-oriented, have learned to think in terms of 
naval strategy. The Soviets are building a surface fleet and not simply 
for the sake of having a symbol of national power. The huge naval con¬ 
struction program is related to specific goals—in particular, to the basic 
Communist goal of world domination. 

Specialists on Mediterranean and North African affairs have cited 
the impact of the Soviet build-up in that part of the world. Four years 
ago there were no more than three or four Soviet naval vessels in the 
Mediterranean. By January 1967, there were 10 or 12. Now there are 
approximately 40. When this force was at its peak, it included a 15,000- 
ton guided-missile cruiser with 12 six-inch guns, three other heavy 
cruisers, five to seven missile-equipped destroyers of the 4,300-ton 
Kynda and smaller Kotlin class, 10 conventional and two nuclear- 
powered submarines, 12 to 15 modem supply ships serving as floating 
bases in protected anchorages, and amphibious landing craft. 

The presence of a Soviet squadron already has had a powerful im¬ 
pact on the thinking of the Mediterranean peoples. Admiral Sir John 
Hamilton, former Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean, 
has discussed in NATO Letter the signifcance of this Soviet force. 

“By maintaining an offshore military presence,” he explained, 

“their fleet gives support to their economic and military aid 
programmes in Egypt, Algeria and Syria. I suggest that it is no 
longer possible to keep military and political considerations in 
separate, watertight compartments. ... It is men’s minds that 
we are trying to win. And whatever may be the military assess¬ 
ment of the significance of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, 

I can assure you . . . that the presence of this fleet is having a 
profound effect on men’s minds. In this respect, it is contributing 


31 


significantly to the rise of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean 
area.” 

Almost 200 years ago, in a war with Turkey, Imperial Russia sent 
its first fleet into the Mediterranean and won an impressive naval vic¬ 
tory. In 1799, they occupied Corfu and the Ionian Islands, and sought 
to gain control of Malta. Those were isolated episodes involving a Rus¬ 
sian presence in the Mediterranean. 33 When the Chief-of-Staff of the Sov¬ 
iet Black Sea fleet acted as a task force commander in the Mediterranean 
in 1966 for joint exercises with the Egyptian Navy, he announced that 
the Soviet naval presence would be “permanent/’ Underlining his state¬ 
ment is the fact that Soviet Navy ship-days (one ship operating one 
day) have increased over 600 percent in the last three years. 

With a powerful squadron in the Mediterranean, the Russians are 
in a position to influence a number of nations, many of which are weak 
and unstable. It is possible for the Soviets to support Egypt and Syria 
directly, to threaten oil shipments to Western Europe, to intervene in 
any new civil war that may take place in Greece, and to expose Turkey 
to pressure from another side. These are only a few of the possibilities 
open to the Soviet Union now that it has warships to implement its 
desires. The Soviets also will be able to engage in brinkmanship when 
Libya, governed by the aging King Idris, faces a crisis of succession. 
Morocco, at the western gate to the Mediterranean, may face trouble 
from Russian naval forces in the event that Algeria resumes its pressure 
on the Moroccan frontier. Even Spain suddenly has cause for concern 
regarding Spanish Sahara. 

Furthermore, as the Soviet task force in the Mediterranean is built 
up, the U. S. Sixth Fleet becomes a less credible deterrent. Already an 
era has ended-a 20-year period in which the Mediterranean was vir¬ 
tually an American lake. Removal of the American naval presence from 
the Mediterranean is a prime Soviet objective. This can be discerned in 
the commentaries that appear in Soviet journals. In August, 1967, 
International Affairs (Moscow) asserted: “The return home of the 
‘floating gendarme’ (the Sixth Fleet) would surely improve the interna¬ 
tional situation in the Mediterranean, and to a large extent facilitate 
the solution of the entire complex of contemporary problems of peace and 
security in Europe”. In other words, withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet would 
turn the Mediterranean into another Black Sea or Caspian—a closed sea 
of the Communist empire. 


33. From an address by Admiral Charles D. Griffin, USN, at Madrid, Spain, No¬ 
vember 1, 1967. 


32 






Few people in the U. S. appreciate the fact that the Soviets already 
have an operational infrastructure which could give them control of the 
Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, should they ever decide to use the facil¬ 
ities they have developed. These include facilities in Egypt, the Yemen, 
Sudan and Somalia. 34 

The threat posed by the Soviet Pacific Fleet also should be spot¬ 
lighted. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, with deep water capabilities, is equipped 
and trained to exercise influence not only in the Western and Northern 
Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean as well. The United States also must 
be alert to the possibility of the Soviets obtaining naval base rights in the 
Pacific. The Soviet Pacific coast ports are severely handicapped by fog 
in spring and fall and by ice in winter. If the vast Pacific world is 
“balkanized,” and small islands seek national status, the opportunities 
for the U.S.S.R. will increase sharply. 

There is nothing covert about the Soviet activity at sea. Admiral 
Gorshkov, the head of the Soviet Navy, has declared: 

“In the past our ships and naval aviation units have operated 
primarily near our coast, concerned mainly with operations and 
tactical coordination with ground troops. Now, we must be 
prepared for broad offensive operations against sea and ground 
troops of the imperialists on any point of the world’s oceans and 
adjacent territories.” 33 

An indication of the Soviet sea power design East of Suez was 
Admiral Gorshkov’s visit to India in February of 1968. Russia and India 
are fashioning military ties, and the Soviet Admiral used the occasion 
of his visit to seek refueling and repair rights for Russian warships at 
Indian ports. The U.S.S.R. already has gained a foothold in the Indian 
naval establishment by providing four submarines. The initial demon¬ 
stration of Soviet sea power in the Indian Ocean drew to an end in 
June, 1968 after the Soviet Pacific Fleet cruiser Dmitri Pozharsky and 
anti-submarine escort ship Steregushchy visited ports in India, Somalia, 
Iraq and Iran. A spokesman for the Soviet fleet, Vice Admiral Alexeyev, 
took the occasion of the Indian Ocean cruise to announce the forth¬ 
coming Red naval visit to Algeria, Chile, Japan, Syria, Egypt, Yugo¬ 
slavia and Uruguay. 36 

The Indian Ocean presents a broad spectrum of opportunities for 


34. Noel Mostert, The Reporter, March 7, 1968. p. 17. 

35. Quoted in Ogonek (Moscow) on 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Fleet. 

36. Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1968. 


33 




the use of naval power to achieve political goals. 37 Bordering the Indian 
Ocean are a number of nations that are potential targets of Soviet ag¬ 
gression. The aggressor state has the advantage, in that many of the 
countries around the rim of the Indian Ocean are in ferment. The East 
African countries, for example, are vulnerable to Soviet politico-military 
pressure and to subversion. If the U.S.S.R. deploys a strong naval 
squadron in the Indian Ocean, including helicopter carriers and naval 
infantry, the options available to the Soviets will multiply unless there 
is a powerful free world countering force. 

For example, the U. S. public should understand that the Soviets 
are using their massive military aid to India as a wedge to obtain naval 
bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These islands command the 
eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean. As they are in easy striking 
distance of Malaysia and Indonesia, they will be of high strategic 
value to the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union's future status as a naval power in the Indian 
Ocean is taken for granted by Indian observers. It is significant that a 
writer for Indian Express of Bombay recently noted that the “arrival of 
the Soviet Navy means that for the first time since Vasco de Gama, West¬ 
ern naval supremacy is faced with a serious challenge." 38 He added that 
“on the western flank of India, the Soviet Navy's appearance will have 
incalculable effect on the Persian Gulf. Already, the Russians have made 
it plain that after the British withdrawal from the area, they do not 
want the American Navy to take it over." Clearly, while the Soviets 
have made only a small beginning in the Indian Ocean, they have 
achieved a considerable gain in psychological terms. South Asians view 
the Soviet Navy as an important factor in their future. 


37. Philip K. Crowe, former U. S. Ambassador to Ceylon, The New York Times, 
May 26, 1968. 

38. Dev Murarka, The Indian Express (Bombay), June 26, 1968. 


34 



SECTION VI. SOVIET HARASSMENT TACTICS 


At the same time that the Soviets are sailing into new waters and 
providing naval weapons to associated states, they are trying rough 
stuff in ship-handling in an effort to intimidate U. S. fleet commanders 
to pull-back their vessels. From the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan, 
the Russians have engaged in obstructive maneuvers. They have cut into 
formations and steared on collision courses. 

The Soviets have made a calculated effort to inhibit U.S. naval 
forces and to gain psychological advantage over U.S. units. 

This Soviet maritime version of its old tactics of aerial “buzzing” 
has to be understood as part of the U.S.S.R/s overall maritime strategy. 
The Soviets not only are building a giant merchant marine and creating 
a powerful navy, but they also want to induce in the mind of the West 
the idea that the U.S.S.R. is the boldest power on the high seas. 

Soviet spokesmen, while ignoring the U.S.S.R/s harassment of Amer¬ 
ican warships, have accused the United States of engaging in such activi¬ 
ties. For example, a writer for Red Star wrote with indignation that a 
U. S. vessel and patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean dazzled the “bridge 
(of a Soviet ship) with searchlights and then dropped flares.” 

To those free world countries that border on the oceans, the naval 
forces of the United States stand for security. The Soviets clearly aim 
to undermine this image of the American fleets and to substitute in the 
minds of these states a fear of Soviet sea power. If the value of American 
naval forces is to be upheld in situations short of war, appropriate re¬ 
taliatory measures will have to be employed to deter the Soviets and to 
make clear to the watching world that the United States not only has 
the best ships but also the strongest resolve to deploy its sea power in 
politically advantageous fashion. 

The Soviets have given much more thought to the political use of 
warships than is generally recognized by the U.S. public. The linking 
of military and political operations, characteristic of Soviet forces since 
the time of Lenin, is especially clear with respect to the U.S.S.R/s naval 
units. Indicative of the Soviet approach to harassment operations at sea 
is this statement by Rear Adm. B. F. Petrov, writing in the Polish Naval 
Survey: 

“Under modem conditions we cannot limit the forms of com¬ 
bat operations exclusively to battle, that is to call each combat 
contact a battle.” 

The dangerous Soviet maneuvers in the Mediterranean and elsewhere 
are properly described as combat contacts. The Soviet objective is the 
expulsion of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, 


35 


the Soviet government has resented American naval influence even in 
pre-Bolshevik times. Thus, the Imperial Russian charge d'affaires in 
Turin, F. I. Tyutchev, reporting to St. Petersburg at the close of the 
1830’s, expressed anxiety over the increasing “penetration of the Amer¬ 
ican fleet into the Mediterranean Sea.” 39 

To be sure, the United States is not about to withdraw the naval 
power that protects Europe’s southern flank and maritime access to 
the Middle East. Yet the new Soviet naval tactics make clear that pro¬ 
tecting the U.S. position in the Mediterranean will be vastly more diffi¬ 
cult than in years past. 

Though a number of countries on Europe’s southern flank are ex¬ 
posed to naval pressure, it is not likely that the Soviets in the very 
near future will take direct naval measures against these states. It is 
reasonable to suppose that preliminary to any direct Soviet naval action 
against Greek, Turkish or Italian forces, for example, will be a campaign 
of what might be termed incident warfare aimed at the U.S. Sixth Fleet. 
Incident warfare at sea is just what the term indicates: calculated 
threatening moves designed to force one’s opponent into a “chicken” 
posture. 

The Soviets long have created incidents to test America’s will in the 
Cold War. The U.S.S.R. has deployed tanks on highways, stopped trains 
to Berlin, dispatched jets to “buzz” the Federal German legislative 
body when it held sessions in free Berlin and otherwise engaged in in¬ 
cident warfare on land and in the air. It is only logical th$t the Soviets 
would turn to the same type of tactics on the high seas. And the United 
States will have to be as firm on the waters of the Mediterranean and 
elsewhere as it has been in the Berlin corridor. 

The most successful example to date of “psy” war at sea is North 
Korea’s hijacking of the electronic intelligence-gathering ship PUEBLO 
in January, 1968. The units of North Korea’s “pinprick” navy, in effect 
acting as proxies pf the Soviet Union, seized the lightly armed American 
vessel and thereby inflicted humiliation on the United States. 

The Soviet Union, with 27,000 miles of coastline, has elaborated the 
'theory of closed seas and historic bays to deny the right of innocent 
passage to free world warships—in violation of the 1958 Geneva Conven¬ 
tion of the Territorial Sea. 

It is true, of course, that no one ever owns an ocean; and only the 
Soviets, for all practical purposes, have closed a portion of a sea, as in 


39. International Affairs (Moscow), August, 1967. 


36 



the case of the Gulf of Finland. Yet the British for more than a century 
came as close to owning the Indian Ocean as one could imagine. The 
United States—from the defeat of Imperial Japan down to the emer¬ 
gence of a Soviet naval threat—was in a position of extraordinary naval 
dominance on many of the waters of this planet, particularly the Medi¬ 
terranean Sea. Now the United States is engaged in a fresh contest for 
control of the seas. The Soviets are determined to overcome the acci¬ 
dent of their geographical position by active naval intervention far 
from the Soviet heartland. They are making a massive financial and 
political investment in sea power. While Moscow’s diplomats talk of 
a detente, Soviet warships have been given a pressure assignment that 
involves increasing the tensions between the two superpowers. 

While the Mediterranean is the principal center of new Soviet naval 
operations, the Soviet Union’s seapower goals are not limited to that 
strategic sea. For decades efforts have been made by the Soviet gov¬ 
ernment to make the Baltic a “mare nostrum.” By abandoning the 
Baltic after the elimination of the German Navy in 1945, the Western 
powers unfortunately made it easy for Stalin to further his plan of 
making the Baltic a Soviet sea. Indeed, the Russians over the years have 
sought to restrict freedom of navigation in the Baltic as well as to limit 
fishing and regulate aircraft movements in what they consider security 
areas. 

The U.S.S.R.’s naval brinkmanship and long efforts to close cer¬ 
tain sea areas to Western warships illustrates its daring and resource¬ 
fulness in attempting to end the historic freedom of the seas. Harass¬ 
ment at sea thus should be seen as another important gauge of the 
Soviet Union’s determination to achieve total victory in oceanic space. 


37 


SECTION VII. U.S. AND SOVIET OCEAN STUDIES 
A COMPARISON 


The Soviets have engaged in a crash program designed to give them 
supremacy in all areas of maritime power. For years, they have devoted 
major resources to oceanographic studies and to research in polar 
waters. These studies enhance the Soviet Navy's capability, especially 
in submarine operations in the Far North where they have an important 
supply route and which they regard as an interior zone for sea-based 
missile strikes against North America. Two hundred oceanographic ves¬ 
sels are assigned to applied and basic ocean research. Nine thousand 
scientists are utilized in a variety of oceanographic programs. The data 
gathered by these scientific vessels and workers, as well as by the 
worldwide fleet of trawlers and auxiliaries, is of direct value to the 
Soviet Navy in furtherence of its objectives. 

The Soviets have a great advantage in the fact that all their ships 
at sea, whether nuclear submarines or ordinary fishing trawlers, are 
required to contribute to the country's overall oceanographic effort and 
operate under a centralized control. The aim of this effort extends from 
exploiting the richest fisheries of the world to gathering data useful 
for future naval operations. 

The Soviets also have been in the ocean studies business in a more 
serious fashion for a longer time than the United States or its western 
allies. It is noteworthy that during the International Geophysical Year 
the Soviet oceanographic effort was double that of the United States. 

Over the years, the Soviets have displayed special interest in two 
areas of oceanographic research: the Artie and Antarctic basins. Ex¬ 
tensive amounts of information have been gathered by Soviet scientists 
on ice formations, currents, temperatures and ice drifts—all of which 
are highly important to submarine commanders operating in polar waters. 

A notable feature of the Soviet oceanographic effort is the continu¬ 
ing construction of new scientific vessels. In 1966, for example, the 
Soviet government ordered nine 2,500-ton research vessels from Polish 
shipyards and two somewhat smaller ships from East Germany. These 
were designated for use by the Institute for Oceanography. In the pre¬ 
vious year, the Marine Hydrographic Institute obtained a new research 
ship, the Akademic Knipouich equipped with 13 scientific laboratories 
and with a cruising range of 30,000 miles. 

In comparison to the Soviet oceanography program, U. S. ocean 
studies reflect a lack of governmental concern. Indeed, oceanography 
has been described as a national stepchild. Whereas the United States 


38 


spends more than $4 billion a year for the space program, the total 
amount of money devoted to inner space—oceanic—research and de¬ 
velopment is less than the cost of building a single space vehicle. 

The United States has 3,700 people engaged in ocean studies or 
only a little more than a third of the manpower the U.S.S.R. has as¬ 
signed to this field of studies affecting national defense. The U. S. has 
50 fewer ships engaged in oceanographic work and only 1,000 ocean¬ 
ographers as compared to the 1,500 in this profession in the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets have 12 schools of oceanography; the United States 
has one. 

The United States is pioneering in the man-in-the-sea program and 
in its deep submergence program, but the ,overall support given to ocean 
studies is very limited. When ocean studies first received major govern¬ 
mental attention in 1963, President Kennedy proposed expenditure of 
$2 billion over a 10-year period to explore and develop ocean resources. 
In four years, the United States has spent less than one-sixth of that 
amount. Yet the economic importance of the ocean depths, let alone their 
military significance, is enormous. Already 16 percent of the world's oil 
is being taken from the ocean floor, and the percentage is increasing. 

The U. S. public needs a greater awareness ,of the technological prob¬ 
lems involved in constructing deep submergence combat vessels of the 
future. Because of the tremendous pressures below the 2,000-foot mark, 
the submersibles of the future may have to be of a new shape. Certainly, 
new materials, such as fiber glass, will be needed in new forms, and new 
modes of propulsion such as fuel cells will be required. Obviously, exten¬ 
sive research and development programs are necessary. 

The record shows that the United States simply isn't devoting suf¬ 
ficient resources to the race for undersea knowledge. Our government's 
failure to move ahead with vigor in ocean studies gives the Soviet Union 
additional opportunity to effect our national burial at sea. 


39 


SECTION VIII. U.S. OCEANIC SUPREMACY THREATENED 

What the Soviet Union’s development as a naval power means is 
that the strategic naval balance is changing in the world—to the ad¬ 
vantage of the U.S.S.R. Obviously, any change in the U.S.S.R.’s status 
as a naval power alters the overall balance of strategic forces. 

At the time of the Cuban crisis, the Soviets had an immensely 
powerful ground army and a large rocket force, but they were still 
militarily handicapped because they lacked strategic mobility. The geo¬ 
graphical position of the Soviet Union makes difficult the effective 
application of military forces. This was apparent during the Cuban 
crisis when the lack of a strong surface fleet seriously hindered the 
U.S.S.R. The Soviets realized that they were incapable of bringing their 
power fully to bear in remote regions because they lacked ships. Now, 
the situation is changing rapidly. The presence of a Soviet Squadron in 
the Mediterranean, for example, has produced a new power balance 
there. 

The visit of Soviet warships to Iraq in the spring of 1968 apparently 
contributed to political change in that country. What’s happening is that 
Soviet naval forces are gaining in visibility, and this has a political 
impact on weak states. Naval power also gives the U.S.S.R. a new ca¬ 
pacity for surprise in its politico-military operations. 

It is evident that the leaders of the Soviet Union have made a far- 
reaching decision to enormously increase the U.S.S.R.’s strategic mo¬ 
bility. They intend to exercise Soviet power not just in such natural 
and traditional preserves as the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea but thous¬ 
ands of miles from Soviet cities. The sustained growth of their naval 
forces indicates that within another five years the Soviets will have the 
capability for naval intervention in the most distant regions, including 
the landing of the newly activated force of black-bereted marines or 
naval infantry. 40 

The Soviets have comprehensive goals in developing their naval 
forces. The chief of the Soviet Navy has said—and the West would be 
foolish to discount his assertion—that his ships have long-range homing 
torpedoes and new types of conventional weapons with increased muz¬ 
zle velocities, greater ranges, and improved accuracy, as well as new 
rocket-equipped aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters that 
can “unpreventably” hit surface vessels and submarines. 

About the time of the Cuban crisis, 15 leading Soviet military theo- 


40. The Economist (London), May 18, 1968. p. 20. 


40 



reticians, headed by Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, prepared the volume 
Military Strategy that revealed the new direction of Soviet thinking 
with respect to sea warfare. 41 The volume constituted a major Soviet 
break with defensive concepts of sea warfare. The authors stated: 

“The world oceans will be the Navy’s theater of military opera¬ 
tions.” 

This statement is sufficient reply to those who persist in seeing 
Soviet naval forces as primarily defensive and deterrent in concept. The 
Soviet submarines operating in the Mediterranean could hardly be con¬ 
sidered as guarding the homeland. Neither are the new amphibious 
ships designed for Russian coastal operations. They may find employ¬ 
ment on the Horn of Africa, in the Persian Gulf or beyond. Further¬ 
more, the existence of a fleet of 250 attack submarines and 100 missile¬ 
firing submarines in Communist hands is the most telling argument for 
the possibility of undersea conflict. The submarine, after all, is basically 
an offensive weapon, and the notion that the U.S.S.R. maintains a huge 
submarine force simply as a defensive measure against the United States 
is not convincing. 

The United States also will have to bear in mind that as the Soviets 
augment their naval capabilities, the exercise of these capabilities is 
likely to become increasingly attractive. Naval forces provide another 
way to pursue the goals that are common to Marxist-Leninist political 
strategy and the traditional expansionism of historic Russia. Already, 
according to the Department of Defense, “the Soviets now operate 
(submarine) patrols within missile range of the U. S. shores.” Add to 
this the statement of Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of Defense Re¬ 
search and Engineering, that the “increasing activity indicates a sig¬ 
nificantly improved Soviet missile submarine operational capability,” 
and the seriousness of the Soviet naval threat becomes crystal clear. 

The United States must consider the full range of likely Soviet de¬ 
velopments and operations of the next decade. Soviet emplacement of 
nuclear weapons on the seabed is one of these developments. A United 
Nations study recently pointed out that “nuclear-weapon powers might, 
it is thought, find it desirable to replace land-based missiles with sea¬ 
bed bases or silos.” 42 The study added that satellite surveillance would 
be less effective against missile silos on the ocean floor and noted that 


41. Military Strategy, Edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Frederick A. Praeger, 
1963. 

42. The Military Uses of the Seabed, and the Ocean Floor, United National Report, 
August, 1968. 


41 




such undersea installations “might decrease the consequences to a na¬ 
tion and its population of a nuclear strike against a missile force.” 

If such installations are within the realm of possibility, as they 
most certainly are, then the United States must work towards naval 
systems for detecting and destroying such offensive bases on the sea¬ 
bed. At the same time, the United States must develop new undersea 
law concepts that would give it adequate security against the estab¬ 
lishment of Soviet undersea bases within missile range of the United 
States. 

The precise size of the naval forces the United States must develop 
to ensure American security and survival in the years ahead requires 
a determination that lies outside the scope of this report. But it should 
be noted that a key element in such naval forces is maintenance of a 
strong Marine Corps with the most advanced weapons and transporta¬ 
tion systems for amphibious assaults, riverine warfare and sustained 
combat ashore. 

The pace of Soviet oceanic enterprise is quickening. A decade ago, 
few Americans even considered the possibility that the Soviet Union 
would become a major sea power. U. S. control of the seas seemed be¬ 
yond dispute. Five years ago, no one expected the Soviets to progress 
in submarine design and construction at a very rapid rate. But now 
Soviet missile submarines patrol off our coast. The Soviet submarine 
construction rate far exceeds what was anticipated a few years ago. 
When the United States had overwhelming superiority in nuclear 
weapons, the Soviets bided their time insofar as naval operations were 
concerned. Now that the strategic balance in deliverable megatonnage 
has shifted to the Soviets, the naval forces of the U.S.S.R. are engaging 
in bold politico-military moves. The U.S.S.R.’s transformation from a 
land power to also being an aggressive oceanic power is bound to pro¬ 
duce new aggressiveness. If they conclude that they are in the driver's 
seat in world affairs, the Soviets also may deduce that naval power 
offers the ultimate advantage—the final means of tipping the world 
power balance heavily in their favor. Furthermore, after a nuclear ex¬ 
change, naval power would be the principal residual power available. 

In considering the Soviet sea power surge, Americans need to be 
aware of the fact that any change in the strategic naval balance of the 
U.S.S.R. Vs. the U.S.A. is as threatening to the security of the United 
States as a relative U. S. decline in deliverable megatonnage versus the 
Soviet Union. A gap in naval power, like the megatonnage gap, would 
be enormously dangerous for the United States and its allies. 


42 


The critical factor in the future is the nature of the response the 
United States makes to the growth of Soviet naval forces. The United 
States has the naval experience and the technological ability to leave 
the Soviet Union far behind in terms of sea warfare forces. The real 
issue is whether the United States is determined to maintain and in¬ 
crease its supremacy on the oceans by building a larger and more com¬ 
pletely modern fleet. 

A clear position of U. S. naval superiority or dominance will help 
keep the peace and maintain the freedom of America and its allies. 
The Soviets have respect for strength, and contempt for lack of it. Thus, 
if the United States proceeds at full speed to augment its naval forces, 
the Soviet Union will not be able to wrest the trident from America’s 
grasp. 






















































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